I Introduction
The rule of law as a globally recognized concept is multifaceted (Chesterman, 2008) . In the Common Law tradition it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p.115; Cotterrell, 1992, p.157) . The rule of law concept has been criticized as being of unique European origin, where plural social organization and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp.80-110) . It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p.5) .
The modernization of China started by the imperial Qing court at the end of the last Qing Dynasty at the beginning of 20 th century, continued during the time periods of the Republic of China (ROC 1911 (ROC -1949 and the People's Republic of China (PRC 1949-) . Despite their political and ideological differences, both the ROC and the PRC have striven to build up modern legal systems with the aim of leading China into modernity. However, the formation of the legal system in both the ROC and the PRC has been criticized for conferring a strong instrumental role onto the law to achieve policy goals (Chen, 2008) and, therefore, suffering from the underdevelopment of the rule of law.
In its modernization efforts in the past hundred years，China has been well exposed to the legal norms of western legal systems including the concept of the rule of law. The formation elites to urge reform by referring to state building models in Europe and elsewhere (Horowitz, 2004) .
Reformists maintained that a key part of the Dynasty's reform efforts should be in the development of a new legal system, modelled on western examples. In January of 1901, the Empress Dowager, Ci Xi (1835 Xi ( -1908 , issued an edict calling for the reformation of Chinese law along the lines of western models. However, these efforts ended abruptly when the Dynasty was overthrown during the Xin Hai revolution in 1911, and replaced with the Republic of China. Although the Qing Court's legal reforms were short-lived, they marked the beginning of the reform of Chinese law on the basis of international legal norms, and the Civil Law tradition exhibited by leading European legal systems (Chen, 2008, 24) .
The ROC continued to face the task of modernization through state building.
Constitutionalism and authoritarianism dominated China's institutional design efforts.
Presidential and cabinet styles of government alternated in China during this period, which saw the country racked by corruption and war (Zhao, 1996, p.28) . With the success of the Northern Expedition (1926) (1927) (1928) against local warlords, the Guomindang (GMD, or the Nationalist Party) unified China and established a national government on 1 July 1925 in Guangzhou.
Dr Sun Yat-Sen (1866 -1925 , the founder of the GMD set out the blueprint for the ROC of Sun argued that the GMD should complete the state building in the political tutelage. The state structure should include the National Congress and the Central Government covering five Councils (yuan) of administration, legislation, judiciary, examination and supervision. (Sun, 1924, p.65) .
During the Military Tutelage (1925 -1928) , the government and the military establishment were combined together, and legislative procedures had not yet been established. In April of 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek (1887 -1975 , the successor to Sun Yat-Sen and then head of the GMD, moved the nationalist government from Guangzhou to Nanjing and set up a central government in line with Sun Yat-Sen's design.
In 1928, the GMD publicised the Political Tutelage guidelines following the GMD 2 nd Congress fifth Plenum. The Guideline set out the policy basis for the GMD to play a leading position in the law-making process. It ensured that during the Political Tutelage, the GMD National Congress would replace the National Congress to lead the ROC; when the GMD National Congress is not in session, the power would be delegated to the GMD Central The CCP began its socialist state building, including legal system building, with reference to the USSR's socialist legal tradition. However, from the 1950s to 1978, the formal legal order building in the PRC suffered serious setbacks and was paralyzed due to continuous political movements (Zhu Sanzu, 2011, pp.91-133) . In 1978, the CCP resumed its legal system building, with the aim of supporting its market-oriented reforms (Potter, 2003, p.107 enacted by the central government and its departments; and rule (Tiaoli) by provincial and municipal governments (Gilpatrick, 1950 Under the framework of the Statute of the ROC, the law-making body of the ROC is the legislative yuan of the central government. Legislative proposals can be initiated by the Central Political Council of the GMD, and the organs of the National Government, including the five yuans. 12 Debates on the contents of a bill are placed before the executive yuan with possible reference to the relevant yuan for consultation. After approval by the executive yuan, the bill goes to the legislative yuan for three readings. The bill is then passed to the central government for promulgation (Gilpatrick 1950 Third, whereas the GMD was, in the Statute, formally provided as one party with competence to submit legislative proposals, the CCP in the Legislation Law is more invisible. However, in both legislations the law making process is led and subject to legally provided scrutiny by the GMD and CCP.
Pursuant to the Statute, each legislative proposal is required to submit its legislative principles explaining the rationale for the law-making. The Statute provides that for the legislative proposal, put forward by the GMD, the legal principles would be set out by the GMD Central Political Council and, hence, subject to no further scrutiny. For legislative proposals put forward by the central government, the five yuan, or other institutions, the legal principles of the proposal were reviewed and decided by the GMD Central Political Council itself.
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The Statute provided that the legislative yuan did not have the competence to change the legislative principle set out by the Central Political Council, though it had the competence to state its opinions at the Council. Further, the legislative bill, produced and reviewed by the legislative yuan, could be subject to changes when the Central Political Congress deemed this necessary, before publication. Woodbrige,1900, p.63 ).
Zhang's argument can be summarized into his famous proposal as Zhongxxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong; namely, that Chinese scholarship should be the foundation and western scholarship the application. The argument was widely accepted by the Chinese elite and continued to exert an influence on Chinese society in the century that followed.
A legal reform commission was set up which followed this principle. The commission carefully examined different foreign models, including those from Japan, Europe and the US. Japan's model was recommended given that China and Japan were similar in terms of history, culture and political ideology, and because Japan had successfully transformed into a powerful constitutional monarchy as a result of introducing western-style legal reforms (Huang, 2013) . The commission revised the punitive old law, the Qing Code by abolishing This was also the case in the PRC. In Mao 's China (1949 's China ( -1976 , the development of the Chinese legal system referred heavily to the USSR socialist legal system and the latter's legal doctrines. China applied the socialist legality doctrine where the law should be subordinated to political flexibility. However, China showed a more obvious instrumentality conception of legal rules in comparison with the USSR (Castellucci 2012).
After the Cultural Revolution, Peng Zheng, one of the CCP reformists (1902-1997) designed and led the legal reform from 1978. Peng held a strongly socialist and legalist view of the law, under which the law was viewed as an instrument to achieve the CCP's policy goals (Cai Dingjian, 2010) . In this period, the law governing China's economy was regarded as an area in which the CCP lacked the most experience. Reference was inevitably made to international legal norms by the CCP in this area. However, such reference, according to Peng Zheng, was to be made on the precondition that they served the CCP's policy goals (Potter, 2003, p.201) .
A China-focused legal borrowing strategy has been developed to become one of the principles supporting the PRC legal reform. A China-focused legal borrowing strategy can be observed in the PRC's enactment of the Contract Law in 1999, which was a cornerstone in the construction of a market economy. In developing its Contract Law, China turned to international legal norms for reference, including the UNIDROIT principles (Bonell, 2005, p.38) . Consequently, the 1999 Contract
Law reflects a strong convergence with UNIDROIT principles in areas such as the formation and performance of contracts (Zhang and Huang, 2003) . However, the PRC's reference to the principle of freedom to contract reveals its legal borrowing strategy. Art. 1 of the UNIDROIT sets out that the parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content. It further sets out that the principle is subject to limitations set out by mandatory rules at the national and international levels, and can be derogated in economic sectors where there is no competition.
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However, echoing the principle of freedom to contract, Chinese contract law provides to endorse the principle of voluntariness instead.
Art. 4 of the Contract Law provides that the parties shall, pursuant to law, have the right to enter into a contract of their own free will, and no unit or person may unlawfully interfere.
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The principle of voluntariness in the Chinese Contract Law includes the following:
• Voluntariness in whether to enter into a contract.
• Voluntariness in with whom to enter into a contract.
• This shows that in both the ROC and PRC, law-makers do not focus on viewing law as an autonomous, self-productive normative system. Rather, both legal systems have adopted pragmatic and instrumental attitudes towards international legal norms, including the rule of law.
IV Philosophical and Ideological origins of China's Conception of the Rule of Law
The following analysis shows that a certain historical continuity exists in terms of the emphasis on the instrumental role of the law, from traditional Chinese philosophies to the San Min Zhu Yi upheld by the GMD, to Marxism and Socialist Reinventions upheld by the CCP. 
Law in Imperial China as Confucius Legalist State

Law and San Min Zhu I in the ROC
The ROC in its legal system building was faced with the pressing task of modernizing China Peoples: nationalism (minzuzhuyi), democracy (minquanzhuyi) and the people's livelihood (minshengzhuyi). Sun utilized three methods in developing this ideology: namely, returning to ancient notions of Chinese morality; returning to ancient Chinese learning; and, the adoption of western science (Linebarger, 1937, p.79) .
With respect to ancient Chinese morality, a Confucian-based ethical system and traditional wisdom in social organization were strongly advocated by Sun. With respect to ancient
Chinese learning, Sun believed in Chinese superiority in the social sciences, particularly in the field of political theory. With respect to the adoption of western science, Sun showed a preference for western natural science, and its methodology, over the western social sciences.
This was because Sun believed that the west did not have similar customs and human sentiments as China and, therefore, was not a useful reference (Linebarger, 1937, p.79 ).
Based on this, Sun argued that it was regressive for the ROC to be preoccupied with limiting government power (Lee, 2015) . State building efforts, therefore, were made primarily towards the design of an authoritarian government system, rather than on how to impose constraints on state power (Zhao, 1996, p.29) . The Three Principles of the People, hence, modernized traditional Chinese elitism into a Leninist principle of enlightened leadership (Greiff, 1985) .
Sun's conception of law is fundamentally different from the individual-rights-based conception of law. He denies natural rights and de-emphasizes the role of law to maximize individual interests based on inalienable rights held by individuals. His social service theory of law argues that law is a means to harmonize social interests, and every agent and institution in Chinese society should serve for collective societal purposes. Sun referred back to Confucianism, where he stressed natural human sympathy and the sense of social duty in Shia Ling Liu, 1966) . It was in this background that the legal system in the ROC was predominantly viewed as the instrument to realize statist interests rather than individual interests. The GMD declared that law-making must serve and be consistent with GMD ideology and doctrines, on the ground that such a legal system would be able to save China from the threat of invasion and domestic chaos (Wu Jingxiong et al, 1937, p.909 ).
Law and the CCP's Socialist Ideological Reinvention
In the P.R.China, the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Deng Xiaoping Marxism was regarded as the original and most authoritative source for the conception of law in the jurisprudence of contemporary China (Zhang Mo, 2010) . Marx recognized Law in its positive forms but focused on understanding the role of law in society, rather than on law per se (Barron et al, 2002, p.240) . In Marx's theory of class struggle, law reflects the will of the ruling class and is an instrument used by the ruling class. Hence Marx's sociological understanding of law focuses on the instrumentality role of law in social evolution (Collins, 1982, pp. 2-14) . In Mao's ideological reinvention, the ruling class was expanded from the working class to include the peasantry and others, and the role of law was, hence, viewed as an instrument used by the ruling class to suppress and eradicate the capitalist class through a Leninist style state apparatus (Wu, 2013, p.72) . During this period, Mao Zedong returned to traditional values in Confucianism, when necessary, and viewed the law as a useful tool to achieve political ends, ensuring that the formal legal system did not hinder the interests of his broader political movement (Leng, 1977, p.356) . proposed that rule by law should be the core component of a socialist legal system and formally started the CCP's efforts to theorize the socialist legal system. It provides that:
Ruling the country by law means that the broad masses of the people, under the leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution and other laws, participate in one way or another and through all possible channels in managing state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings and social affairs, and see to it that all work of the state proceeds in keeping with law, and that socialist democracy is gradually institutionalized and codified so that such institutions and laws will not However, the rule by law emphasized setting out institutionalized rules for governance and particularly in ensuring that the Party's basic polices were achieved successfully. It did not touch on the issue of imposing meaningful constraints on the CCP as the ruling Party (Peerenboom, 2001) . The main challenge encountered by the CCP in the theorization process is the tangled relationship between the Supremacy of the CCP in the law-making process based on the state ideology on the one hand, and the CCP's increasingly need for subjecting itself to a rules-based system in order to strengthen its regulatory capacity as a ruling party on the other.
In response, Jiang Zeming highlighted that it is essential to unify the relationship among the CCP leadership, the People's Congress System and the rule by law:
In ruling the country by law, we can unify the adherence to Party leadership, the development of people's democracy and do things in strict accordance with the law, thus ensuring, institutionally and legally, that the Party's basic line and basic policies are carried out without fail, and that the Party plays the role of the core of leadership at all times, commanding the whole situation and coordinating the efforts of all quarters.
In 2003, Hu Jintao proposed the "scientific outlook of development theory". It aimed to tackle the widening social discrepancies in Chinese society by, among other things, improving the legal system. This ideological innovation interpreted Confucian values through a socialist lens and pledged to build a harmonious society (hexie shehui) (Wu, 2013, p.74 ).
However, the CCP's governance of Chinese society relied mainly on traditional grievance processing (Gallagher, 2005) . Law, in the process, continued to be conceived as one instrument to achieve the CCP's goal of stability, and ideological control was imposed onto the functioning of the legal system towards this goal (Minzner, 2011) . 
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The Three Supremes can be regarded as a continued effort made by the CCP in its theorization of the socialist legal system. Chinese scholars' theoretical explorations centre on the argument that there are no conflicts of interests among the CCP, the National People's Congress System and the Law, as all three are concerned with the same goal of representing and achieving the people's interest. First, The CCP as the leading party is determined to serve the people. In order to achieve this, it must act within the law. Second, the socialist ideology determines that the PRC's constitution and laws serve the people and are made under the leadership of the CCP. Third, to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution requires the upholding of the supremacy of the CCP and people's interests (Zhu Liheng 2009). Despite the theoretical vagueness, the key argument used to justify the Three Supremes lies in the conception of law as an instrument to serve the people. Such an instrumental conception is then used to connect the CCP, the NPC and the state-made law, under one framework. Second, the CCP aims to consolidate the formal rule of law construction by strengthening its intra-party disciplinary rules system. The CCP has started its intra-party disciplinary system reconstruction in 2012 and striven to regulate the Party with a more stringent rules-based intra-party disciplinary system, following the 18 th CCP Congress 6 th Plenum in October 2016.
40 Such a reform is deemed necessary as the CCP, as a ruling party, requires an institutionalized and rules-based system to impose constraints on the exercise of power by party members; support the sustainability of the CCP; and improve the compatibility of the CCP rules and the state-made law (Wang Zhengming and Shi Xingzhou, 2016, p.83) . Such a reform is deemed beneficial to China's construction of the rule of law, because the CCP intraparty rules are regarded as a more effective tool to curb the Party's exercise of power, which would then, effectively, safeguard the equality of law within the state law system (Wang Liming, 2016, p.31) . Hence, the rebuilding of the intra-party disciplinary system can be viewed as an effort made by the CCP to disentangle the CCP, the National People's Congress and the state-made law from their origin. It waits to be seen to what extent the development of the intra-party rules system and its linkage with state-made law, would be subject to the rule of law. Nonetheless, the CCP has chosen to turn away from state-made law and return to its intra disciplinary system, to tackle its rule of law challenges. This reflects the fact that the CCP has not shifted from the conception that the state-made law functions as an instrument through which to channel policy goals. While the CCP has expanded its rule of law discourse, its conception of the instrumentality of the law continues to dominate thus far.
In reviewing legal modernization reforms carried out in the ROC and in the PRC, it becomes clear that the Chinese favouritism towards the instrumentality of the law is historical and continuous. The Confucianism-Legalism tradition sets China apart from other pre-modern societies, with respect to the understanding of legality, the internal morality of the law and the social roles of the law. This fundamental, instrumental conception of the law has set the philosophical and historical basis for the GMD and the CCP to strengthen the legitimacy of their instrumental conception of the law and expand their construction of the rule of law discourse. The GMD and the CCP's continuing instrumental conception of the law has, historically, led China on a rule of law path which has diverged from the west. The historical legacy of this development has strengthened and solidified the conception of law as an instrument, in Chinese society. The interaction of Confucianism and Legalism, and the rule of law construction, in both the ROC and the PRC have shaped the rule of law discourse to centre on the instrumentality of the law. This, in turn, makes the instrumental role of the law a strong feature of China's legal culture. 
V Conclusion
Since the PRC started its market oriented reform, it has made massive efforts to enact, amend or revoke laws, with the aim of building up a structured and comprehensive legal order.
Despite its rapid enactment of numerous laws, China's rule of law has made little progress in the eyes of the international legal community.
This experience is, however, not new in China. Similar efforts were made by the GMD in the ROC and similar criticism was received from the international legal community regarding its rule of law.
By comparing the Statute of Legislative Order of the ROC in 1927, and the Legislation Law of the PRC in 2000, this paper shows that there exists a strong similarity with regard to the conception of the rule of law during these two periods. The instrumental role of the law was treated as the predominant content of the rule of law. The formation of such a local perception, on the rule of law, is largely due to the historical continuity of China's legal borrowing strategy on the one hand, and the favour over law's instrumentality running through Chinese legal culture in the past hundred years on the other. However, such a strong emphasis on the instrumental nature of the law poses challenges to both China's and the world's sustainable development. First, there is a limited and ineffective role played by law in China's social governance. Second, the law-making process in China becomes vulnerable to manipulation by interest-driven agents within the process. It waits to be seen how these challenges will be tackled by China's on-going rule of law construction.
China's rule of law discourse does not, however, take place in a vacuum. Hence, critical analysis on the historical and contextual factors which have shaped China's rule of law conception in its modernization efforts, can establish the basis for us to better understand the embeddedness which continues to guide, shape and influence the rule of law in China. 
